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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0\VYliEE, INC., a corporation,
Plaintif!J garnishee plaintiff
and appellantJ
vs.

ROBBINS lVIARCO POLO, aka and
dba ROBBINS MARIC-0-POLO, a
corporation, and ROBBINS TRAV-

EL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

a

Case No.
10162

corporation,
Dcfclldants and judgment debtorsJ
vs.

DVVIGI-IT G. LUlVIAN,
Garnishee defendant and
respondent.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~T

STATEniENT OF FACTS
This is a garnishee action by plaintiff, garnishee
plaintiff and appellant (hereinafter called plaintiff)
against garnishee defendant and respondent (herein-
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after called defendant) based upon an alleged debt
from defendant to judgment debtor Robbins Travel
International, Inc. (hereinafter called Robbins, Inc.)
arising out of assertedly illegal payment by Robbins,
Inc. to defendant pursuant to a corporate note given
defendant allegedly in the purchase of stock in Robbins,
Inc. owned by defendant. The Trial Court, sitting without a jury, entered a decree dismissing the action (R.
18). On appeal, plaintiff prays that this Court reverse
such decree and remand this case to the Trial Court
with the direction to enter judgment against defendant
and in favor of plaintiff in the sum of the judgment
debt owing by Robbins, Inc. to plaintiff (R. 1), but
not to exceed $1,900.00 (R. 5-6; Tr. 3).
The Trial Court likely did not "find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon," as required by URCP 52 (a). Rather, it characterized its memorandum decision (R. 16-17) as constituting such findings and conclusions ( R. 18). In that
the transcript is relatively brief and, moreover, because
the pertinent objective facts are without dispute, the
methodology adopted does not impede consideration of
the salient issues. Such facts follow.
In February or March, 1960, defendant entered
into a transaction with Robbins, Inc. through its president, Allen B. Robbins (Tr. 3-4, 16). The arrangement
agreed upon was that defendant "would put money
into Robbins Travel and would come in as an owner
and as an officer" (Tr. 17). His ownership was to be

6
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()f a gi\·en percent of the ~orporation - Mr. Robbins
kstitied ~0'/0 and defendant recalled 48% (Tr. 5, 19),
in cxehange for $-1,000.00 paid in (Tr. 20). It was also
agreed that defendant would become a director (Tr.
:W) ..At or about the time defendant came into the
corporation and became an officer, vice-president, he
did in fact pay in the $4,000.00 which was placed in a
corporate account (Tr. 5, 7, 19-20). Mr. Robbins testified that defendant became a director, but defendant
said that he never participated "in any kind of director
aetiYities" ( Tr. 5, 20). A stock certificate was never
delivered defendant for whatever number of shares the
agreed percentage represented (Tr. 12-14, 17-18).

By April, 1960, the relationship between defendant
and Robbins, Inc.'s president - Mr. Robbins - had
becmne inan1icable. According to defendant:
"I wanted out of the corporation. I wanted my
nwney out, and I wanted to terminate my employn1ent there. This was agreeable with Mr.
Robbins. As he has mentioned he was dissatisfied
with n1y efforts and by mutual consent we agreed
that I would leave." (Tr. 18).
:\Ir. Robbins' testimony was substantially identical (Tr.
10, 13, 15).

It was agreed that defendant would withdraw from
Robbins, Inc. (Tr. 10, 13, 15, 18). On April 11, 1960,
"Jir. Robbins delivered to defendant a promissory note
for the n1oney he had put into the corporation, executed
both by the corporation and personally (R. 11; Tr. 8-10,
13).

7
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Payments of at least $1,900.00 were made prior to
May 11, 1961, to defendant by Robbins, Inc. (Tr. 11-12,
18-19; Ex. D-1). The corporation was insolvent at the
times of such payments, i.e. its liabilities exceeded its
assets ( Tr. 12).
Plaintiff's judgment against Robbins, Inc. (R. I)
was based upon an indebtedness incurred subsequent to
such payments (Tr. 14).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRANSACTIONS HERE INVOLVED
CONSTITUTED: (A) A SALE OF STOCK BY
ROBBINS, INC. TO DEFENDANT; AND,
LATER AND SEPARATELY, (B) A PURCHASE OF SUCH STOCK FROM DEFENDANT BY ROBBINS, INC.
Plaintiff characterizes as stock transactions both
the agreement of February or March, 1960, by which
defendant "put money into Robbins Travel and would
come in as an owner" ( Tr~ 17) and the later agreement
of April, 1960 satisfying defendant's desire to be "out
of the corporation. I wanted my money out, and I
wanted to terminate my employment there" (Tr. 18).
Defendant disputes this denomination (R. 9). The Trial
Court expressly refused to rule upon the character of
the two transactions, stating: "This Court is not going
to determine that this was a stock transaction or a loan
transaction . . ." ( R. 17) .
8
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A.
'i'hc init·ial agreement of Febnwry or March~ 1960,
and JHI/Jmcnt lJ.tf defendant thereunder~ constituted defendant a stockholder in

Robbins~

Inc.

'rhere is no question that an integral part of the
i11itial agreen1ent between Robbins, Inc. and defendant
was that the latter would become a part owner of the
corporation. This was the testimony of Mr. Robbins,
who handled the transaction for Robbins, Inc. (Tr. 5).
:\lore i1nportant, the defendant himself so stated (Tr.
17, 19). Although the two participants differed as to
the percentage of ownership to be held by defendant,
they concurred that defendant was to acquire such a
percentage (Tr. ·5, 19). It is further undisputed thatpursuant to such agree1nent and well in advance of the
later agreement of April, 1960 - defendant did pay
the $4,000.00 specified by the agreement into the corporation, and that it was placed in the corporation account
(Tr. 5, 7, 19-20).
Based upon this recitation, it is patent that the
agreement Yi'as not for defendant to make a $4,000.00
.. loan" to the corporation, and that the $4,000.00 in fact
paid in pursuant to such agreement did not constitute
a "loan." Quite the contrary. According to defendant's
own testi1nony ( Tr. 17, 19) , he became a part owner,
not a creditor, of Robbins, Inc. through his payment.!
On cross-examination,_ Mr. Ro~?ins. denied that the $4,0000.00
was a loan (Tr. 14). Neither on mrec"L nor on cross did defendant
so describe it. As noted, he in fact affirmatively indicated his
ownership capacity (Tr. 17, 19).

1
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It is elementary that acquisition of stock is the
means by which one gains part "ownership" of a corporation I6-2-5 (7) UCA, I953 2 ; I3 Am. Jur.~ Corporations § I72. In consequence, the agreement was clearly
for defendant to obtain a stock right, and defendant's
testimony corroborates Mr. Robbins' more explicit recitation (Tr. 5) to that effect.
It is, of course, undisputed that defendant did not
receive a stock certificate from Robbins, Inc. evidencing
his stock interest (Tr. I2-I4, 17-I8). But "it is well
settled that a certificate of stock in a corporation is not
the stock itself," II Fletcher~ Cyc. Corps.§ 5092 at p .75;
Robey v. Hardy~ 63 Utah 23I, 224 Pac. 889,892 (I924).
Thus, the failure to deliver a stock certificate to defendant is immaterial. There is an absence of evidence of any
demand for such delivery. In fact, Mr. Robbins' testimony was that- undoubtedly in the pattern of many
closely held corporations - '' (n) o certificates were
issued to anybody" (Tr. I4). The record reflects, therefore, that, although defendant concededly had received
no stock certificate~ he maintained - by reason of his
initial agreement - a stock right.
Review of pertinent authorities demonstrates that
the most significant factor among those undisputed isfar from the nondelivery of the stock certificate- the
payment of the agreed consideration, $4,000.00, by the
defendant into the corporation at or about the time of
2 At all times pertinent to this action, the Utah Business Corporation Act, effective January 1, 1962, was inapplicable. In consequence, citations throughout are to Title 16, Chapter 2 UCA,
1953, then effective.
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the initial agreeinent (Tr. ID-~0). For~ by such payment, the contract became nonc,rccutory~ defendanfs
sloe/,· ri!Jhf 1'csted, and he became- at law - a stock/wider in Huhbins, Inc. As stated by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Stech· 'l'. [(ramlich, 52 Idaho 156, 12 P.2d 260,
:W~ (1932):
"\ Vhen stock is paid for, it is in fact issued,
irrespective of the issuance of the certificate which
is nothing more nor less than evidence of the
stockholder's ownership."
In accord is Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Gunderson~
106 F.~d 633 ( 8 Cir., 1939).

'Yhen, therefore, defendant paid in the $4,000.00
he becmne a stockholder. In this capacity, he had no
further obligations toward the corporation. Its obligation was to hi1n as its stockholder.
~'his

Court has recognized the principles here enunciated. It has held that, once the stock agreed upon is
paid for, the obligee becomes a stockholder and- upon
eorporate failure following demand to deliver an appropriate certificate - he Inay, at his option, either sue
the corporation at law for the conversion of the stock
or in equity for the delivery of such certificate, Robey
l'. Hardy, supra at 224 Pac. 892; Coray v. Perry Inv.
Co., 50 Utah 70, 166 Pac. 672 (1917).
Prior to the second agreement, that of April, 1960,
defendant's relationship with Robbins, Inc. had ripened
into that of a stockholder. At any time prior to entrv
into that later agreement, he could have - following
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demand- compelled issuance of a certificate as evidence
thereof. His stock position was clear.

B.
The second agreement of April, 1960, was one for
purchase by Robbins_, Inc. of defendant-'s stockholder
interest in the purchasing corporation.
Given defendant's status as a corporate stockholder
prior to the agreement of April, 1960, there is no question that such second agreement constituted a repurchase
by the corporation of such stock interest. Defendant
testified that the effect of the agreement was to take
him "out of the corporation" and to get his "money out"
(Tr. 18), and Mr. Robbins' testimony was to the same
effect (Tr. 10, 13, 15). A divestiture of defendant's
interest in the corporation, i.e. his interest as a stockholder, necessarily required a sale of his stock ( Tr. II) .
It is clear, further, that the sale from defendant
was to - and the purchase by - Robbins, Inc. Although Mr. Robbins co-signed the note as an individual,
it is undisputed that the $I,900.00 with which we are
here concerned was paid by the corporation out of its
corporate account (Tr. 12-I3) .3
The fact that defendant's status as a corporate employee terminated at or about the time of the agreement to purchase his stock
interest has no bearing on the transaction. There being no evidence that his employment was for a term, the presumption is
that it was terminable at will, Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Annos. 11 A.L.R.
740, 100 A.L.R. 835, 161 A.L.R. 709; 35 Am. Jur., Master and
Servant, ~19 at pp. 457-58. It could, thus, have been terminated
by either party independent of the purchase of defendant's
stock, there being no representation by either defendant or Mr.
Robbins that the initial agreement of February or March, 1960
made defendant's status as an employee legally dependent upon
his status as a stockholder, or vice-versa.
a
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It should he n1entioned in passing that, taken in the
light of the objective facts and the applicable law, the
clieitation upon cross examination of Mr. Robbins of
the conclusion that "actually the original agreement was
modified by a later agreement" ( Tr. 15) ) may mislead.
The agreernent of April, 1960 patently was not the conclusion of a series of continuing negotiations between
the parties initiated in February or March of that year.
There were, rather, two separate agreements. Rights
under the initial agreement had vested prior to entry
into the second agreement, i.e. the one for purchase by
Robbins, Inc. of its own stock. The only manner in which
the later agreement, if legal~ modified the former was
through changing the status of the parties created and
n·sted under the prior contract.

.A_ case remarkably similar on its facts to the instant
controYcrsy, and one which is in accord with the concepts presented both under subdivisions A and B of this
Point, is 1Jlindenberg v. Carmel Film Productions~ 132
Cal. .App. 2d 598, 282 P.2d 1024 (1955). The initial
agreement, dated March 8, 1948, was that Mindenberg
"(p) ending the issuance of stock," "shall have a present
18\t (1o interest in and to all the assets of said corporation." Thereafter, on April 30, 1948, Mindenberg and
the corporation entered into a second, and separate ( albeit it Inodified the status created by the first), contract
whereby Jiindenberg- in consideration of $26,250.00
payable in installments from the corporation - did
.. assign, transfer, set over, deliver, acquit and release
to Cannel Film Productions, Inc., all of my right, title
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y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and interest therein, whether represented by stock or
arising out of that certain 'Memorandum of Agreement'
between the parties hereto dated March 8, 1948." In
the suit, one by Mindenberg to recover unpaid installments, the corporation defended upon the ground that
the second agreement was illegal as specifying an unpermissable purchase by it of its own stock. Mindenberg
countered by asserting, as does the defendant here, that
he had never been issued stock certificates for the 18%%,
and that there was no sale or purchase of corporate stock.
The trial court so held, but the Court of Appeals reversed, stating at 282 P.2d 1031 that the lower court's
holding:
" (I) gnores the legal effect of the agreement
for 'a present 18%,% interest in and to all of
the assets of said corporation ... ' The issuance
of the certificate was not essential to plaintiff
becoming a shareholder ... 'Capital stock' means,
'not the shares of which the nominal capital is
composed, but the actual capital- i.e. assetswith which the corporation carries on its corporate business' ... The sale of plaintiff's 18%%
interest was a sale of stock." (Citations eliminated.)
The Court of Appeals then held that Mindenberg had
failed to sustain his burden of proving that the payment
for the corporation's own stock under the subsequent
agreement would be out of surplus, rather than out of
capital, as required by California law, and therefore
reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff.
In the instant case, as in Mindenberg: (I) defend-
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ant's percentage holding constituted a holding of stock,
crt.' II in the absence of the delivery of a stock certificate;
and (~) defendant's and Robbins, Inc.'s mutual agreement that defendant return his interest in consideration of the corporation's installment payments constitutnl a purchase by such corporation of its own stock.
It shall now be demonstrated that here, as in Mindcnberg, the purchase by Robbins, Inc. from defendant
was illegal.
POINT II
TI-IE $1,900 PAID TO DEFENDANT BY
ROBBINS, INC. VVAS MADE IN THE ILLEGAL AND VOID PURCHASE OF ITS
0\VN STOCK.

A.
Tlu: general n~;le in Utah is that a purchase by a
corporation of its own stock is illegal and void.
The Utah rule on this subject was established by
Pace v. Pace Bros.~ 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1 (1936), reh.
den.~ 91 Ctah 149, 63 P.2d 590 (1936). The decision,
neither rnodified nor reversed by subsequent judicial pronouncenlent, in effect adopted the English common law
rule that a corporation may not - absent certain judicially engrafted exceptions or express statutory authority -purchase its uwn stock, and that any such purported purchase is void, Trevor v. Whitworth~ 12 App.
15
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Cas. 409 (1887). The holding was premised upon the
public policy enunciated by 103-12-4 ( 2) Rev. St., 1933,
a penal statute, which rendered it a misdemeanor for
any corporate director:
"To divide, withdraw or in any manner, except
as provided by law, pay to the stockholders, or
any of them, any part of the capital of the corporation.''
On petition for rehearing, this Court further extended the holding to prohibit such purchases out of
"surplus," i.e. restricted permissible payments to stockholders to dividends, unless otherwise provided by the
aforementioned judicial exceptions or statutory authority, id.~ 63 P.2d 591.
In consequence, at the behest of intervening judgment creditors of the corporation,4 the former stockholder was prohibited from enforcing notes and mortgages given him in exchange for corporate stock.
This Court in Pace placed heavy reliance upon the
damage done to creditors- prior, present or futurethrough the dissipation of capital inherent in a purchase
by a corporation of its own stock, stating at 59 P.2d 5:
"It may be remarked that it would give little
comfort to a creditor if he found all the assets
gone but the treasury full of the corporation's
own stock certificates paid for by its assets."
4 Whose credits and resulting judgments were subsequent to the
notes and mortgages given plaintiff, Abstract of Record (State
Library), pp. 7, 14, 32, 33.
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This reasoning closely Inirrored that of Lord Herschell
in his opinion in Trevor v. JVhitworth~ supra (decided
upon st:rintin1 opinions), when he said that creditors:
" ... have a right to rely, and were intended
by the Legislature to have a right to rely, on the
capital remaining undiminished by any expenditures outside these limits, or by the return of any
part of it to the shareholders."
For con1prehensive authority additional to that cited in
l'ace to the effect that treasury stock cannot be· considered a true asset of a corporation and that, by the very
nature of the corporate structure, it cannot own any
part of itself so that such a transaction is in reality a
reduction of equity, see footnote 5, Fultz v. Anzac Oil
Corp.} 240 F.2d 21, 22-23 ( 5 Cir., 1957).
The statute upon which this Court in Pace predicated the public policy against such a reduction of equity
was equally effectual at all times here pertinent. 78-134 (2) UCA, 1953 is identical to 103-12-4 (2) Rev. St.
1933, except for certain provisions relative to preferred
stock not here applicable (Tr. 12). Additionally, 18-21i Rev. St., 1933 -which this Court in Pace indicated
would contribute weight to the public policy pronounced
had it been in effect at the time of the transaction there
considered, 59 P.2d 3 - was incorporated in 16-2-15
lTC ...-\.. 1953.
Therefore, unJlY;s otherwise "provided by law," the
payments made by Robbins, Inc., to defendant pursuant to the stock purchase were illegal and void.
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B.
The subject stock pu1'chase was not authorized by
16-2-16 UC.A, 1953.
By L. 1951, ch. 23, §2, the legislature specified
certain conditions under which a corporation permissively "may purchase or redeem one or more shares of
any and all of its own capital stock," 16-2-16 DCA,
1953. This constituted a "provision of law" which, when
applicable, would justify a departure from the general
rule enunciated in Pace~ Shumaker v. U etx Exploration
Co.~ 157 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D. Utah, 1957).
Two factors which reflect upon the scope and purpose of the enactment require examination at the outset.
First, as shall become apparent, 16-2-16 constituted
both a codification of judicial exceptions recognized
by Pace and a legislative creation of additional exceptions. Second, the Utah legislature did not follow the
precedent of its California counterpart. Prior to 1929,
based upon a similar penal statute, the rule adopted by
Pace had applied in California and-in fact-this Court
in Pace relied heavily upon California precedents, 59
P.2d 3, 6-7. In that year, however, the California legislature enacted a statute which gave positive authorization to corporations, subject to certain specified exceptions, to purchase their own stock; for the legislative
history, see Good1nan v. Global Industries~ 80 Cal.
App. 2d 583, 182 P.2d 300 (1947). In Utah, to the
contrary, there remained after 1951 a positive prohi-
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bition against such purchases, subject only to the permissiYc exceptions specified.
From the first factor, it is concluded that judicial
precedent will prove-in some instances- helpful in
interpretation of 16-2-16. From the second factor, it
is concluded that Utah law derogates against corporate
self-purchase unless it can be demonstrated that a
given permissive condition exists.
The latter conclusion is supported by the decision
of this Court in White v. Western Empire Life Ins.
Co., 11 Utah 2d 227, 357 P.2d 483, 484 (1960), in
which the requirement of "substantial evidence" was
specified to justify the finding of an exception. The
White decision is cited by 6A. Fletcher Cyc. Corps.
§2848 at p. 372 ( 1963 cum. supp. at p. 12) in support
of the following statement:
"However, even if the right to purchase its
own stock is recognized, the right to purchase
should be confined within strict limits . . ."
'Vith this background, particular examination of
the 16-2-16 exceptions in the context of the undisputed
facts will be undertaken. The only two statutory segments which have conceivable applicability are subdiYisions (a) and (f). The Trial Court relied upon both,
finding: ( 1 ) '' (I) f this was a stock transaction it would
appear to the Court that it is clearly exempt by Section
16-2-16, Utah Code, 1953, Subsection (a)"; and (2)
"(I)t clearly appears from the evidence that the finan-
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cial structure of Robbins Travel Corporation was not
in any way affected by the transaction" (R. 16).
Analysis will demonstrate that neither finding is
supported by any evidence, let alone substantial evidence, and that- in fact- the undisputed facts and
applicable law impel the conclusion that neither permissive condition exists in this case.
I.

16-2-16(a) is inapplicable to this case.
16-2-16(a) permits corporate purchase of its own
stock " ( t) o collect or compromise, in good faith, a debt,
claim or controversy with any shareholder."
Although the Trial Court was less explicit than
might be desired in expressing its reasons for finding
condition (a) fulfilled, it would appear that the key
is "controversy." This conclusion is reached by the process of elimination. It is patent that there was, prior to
the agreement of April, 1960 (which agreement was
one, at law, by Robbins, Inc., to purchase its own
stock), no "debt" or "claim" flowing from defendant
to the corporation or vice-versa. Thus only the "controversy" category remains.
The only evidence bearing upon any "controversy"
was that, following defendant's entry-as an owner and
officer-into the affair of Robbins, Inc., Mr. Robbins
grew dissatisfied with his efforts. They then decided
mutually that defendant would get "out" of the cor-
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poration. The J\ pril agreement ensued ( Tr. 13, 15,
18).

Consideration of condition (a) demonstrates that
this type of "controversy" is not of the sort which fulfills the statutory requirement for a departure from the
general rule prohibiting purchase by a corporation of
its own stock.
In the first place, the a controversy.>} testified to was
not bef1.occn Robbins} Inc._, as an entity and the defendant, but rather between Mr. Robbins and the defendant.
To allow a dominant individual in a corporation to
"compromise" his differences with a fellow stockholder
through the corporate purchase of the other's stockand the consequent dissipation of the capital fund held
for past, present and future creditors-would not only
expand condition (a) beyond its apparent dictate that
the "debt, clai1n or controversy" involve the corporation,
but would run counter to the well-established policy
of the law that capital stock shall not be purchased by
the corporation to benefit any individual stockholder
in an intra-corporate fuss. The re1nedy of the individual
shareholder is rather than a raidingn the corporate
creditor's f'u.nd., to purchase for his own account and at
his own expense the stock of the fellow shareholder with
tchom he has a ucontroversyn. Both Lord Herschell and
Lord ~Iacnaghten in Trevor v. Whitworth_, supra, dealt
with the legality of a purchase by the corporation to
remove dissenting stockholders .
J

. ..-\.ccording to the former:
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"I can quite understand that the directors of
a company may sometimes desire that the stockholders should not be numerous, and that they
should be persons likely to leave them with a
free hand to carry on their operations. But I
think it would be dangerous to countenance the
view that, for reasons such as these, they could
legitimately expend the moneys of the company
to any extent they please in the purchase of its
shares. No doubt if certain shareholders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company,
and are willing to sell their shares, they may be
bought out; but this must be done by persons,
existing shareholders or others, who can be induced to purchase the shares, and not out of the
funds of the company."
Said the latter :
"Who are the shareholders whose continuance
in a company the company or its executives consider undesirable? Why, shareholders who quarrel with the policy of the board, and wish to turn
the directors out; shareholders who ask questions
which it may not be convenient to answer; shareholders who want information which the directors
think it prudent to withhold. Can it be contended
that when the policy of directors is assailed they
may spend the capital of the company in keeping
themselves in power, or in purchasing the retirement of inquisitive and troublesome critics?"
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Supreme
Court of Delaware has recently held officers of a corporation liable for accounting to shareholders when
they cause such corporation, for their own benefit, to
purchase its own stock, even though corporate capital
22
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was
-~Ot>

not thereby iinpaired, Bennett v. Propp_, 187 A.2d
(Del., 1962).

Summarizing the first deficiency in the Trial Court's
application of condition (a) : ( 1) no "controversy" of
any type between defendant and the corporation was
shown, which would justify Robbins, Inc.'s purchase of
its own stock ; and ( 2) there is an established legal
interdiction against "raids" on corporate capital to
resolve intra-corporate business disputes-it is up to
one disputant to buy out the other.
Secondly, and equally determinative, a consideration of accepted legal definition and a reading of C01fdition (a) in its entirety leads to the conclusion that, as
used in the context, the word a controversy-'-' does not
refer to any dispute-business, social or otherwise, but
rather to justiciable disputes, ones which are subject to
adjudication. This is so for three reasons.
( 1) In its legal sense, the word "controversy" refers
to justiciable controversies. Hence Black"s Law Dictionary (4th Ed), at p. 400 defines the word thusly:

''Controversy - A litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action
or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable
dispute."
. As a legal term, the word "controversy", therefore, embodies the concept of a dispute which has ripened into
justiciability.
( 2) The conclusion reached by a consideration of
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the legal definition of the word "controversy" is further
strengthened by an examination of the entire condition
(a). In context, the word appears disjunctively, as
follows: "debt, claim or controversy." Both "debt" and
"claim" are easily identifiable as terms referring to
justiciable disputes. Under the rule of interpretation,
noscitur a sociis_, the meaning of a word is known from
the words which accompany it. Had the legislature
intended the word "controversy" to be applied to any
dispute, whether justiciable or not, it would not have
utilized the terms "debt" and "claim", for they would
have been superfluous. It is inherent in the drafting of
the disjunctive that the legislature desired to allow
collection or compromise of any justiciable dispute.
( 3) The conclusion that a justiciable dispute was
contemplated is strengthened by an examination of
established law at the time of the enactment of 162-16. Both under the English rule and under the Pace
decision, it was recognized that a corporation might
receive its own stock to collect or compromise an outstanding obligation, Pace v. Pace Bros._, supra at 59
P.2d 3; Levy, "Purchase by an English Company of its
own Shares", 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 45, 55-56 (1930).
In this light, it appears likely that condition (a), at
least, was a codification of common law, to be judged
by common law standards. If so, it clearly applies only
to justiciable disputes and excludes the settlement of
non-justiciable disputes, particularly when they are
between two shareholders and not between a shareholder
and the corporation, see Levy, "Purchase by a Corpo-
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ration of its own Stock", 15 1llinn. L. Rev. 1, 15, 31-32
( HJ30).

\ Vha tevcr controversy the record reveals as a
precedent to the April agreement (by which the corporation arranged to purchase its own stock) was between ~lr. Robbins and defendant, not between Robbins, Inc., and defendant. It was, moreover, non-justil'iabel. A business disagreement between shareholders,
absent smne grounds for suit, is not a province of the
courts.
The Trial Court erred in finding condition (a) to
be met.

2.
IH-:?- lt) (f) is inapplicable to this case.
Condition (f) allows corporate self-purchase " ( i) n
any case where the use of the funds or property of a
corporation for such purchase or redemption would not
cause the in1pairment of that portion of its assets acquired as consideration for its shares .... " Its prime
effect is to restrict the meaning given "capital" by Pace
at 63 P.:?d 591. Following its enactment, purchase by
a corporation of its own stock could be made out of
surplus. The statutory definition of "capital" is in
accord with the general contemporary concept, 18
C.J.S., Corporations:> §193 (b) at p. 616.

The eYidence regarding the financial condition at
the ti1nes of payment of moneys received by defendant
is undisputed. Robbins, Inc. was insolvent at all such
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times. (Tr. 12). It had no surplus. The purchase vvas
thus bound to impair5 the capital of the corporation,
i.e. "that portion of its assets acquired as consideration
for its shares." The financial structure of the corporation was obviously adversely affected, for $1,900.00
in cash assets was paid to purchase treasury stock which
as previously noted, could not properly be classed as
an asset, Fultz v. Anzac, supra.
In Cleveland v. Jencks Mfg. Co.~ 54 R.I. 218, 171
Atl. 917,918 (1934), the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
in considering a statute which-as ours-prohibits corporate self-purchase resulting in impairment of capital,
stated:
"It is obvious that an insolvent corporation
would not possess assets sufficent to purchase
shares of its own stock without impairing assets."
That is the precise situation which is here encountered.
At the time of payments, the corporation was insolvent.
And the time of payment controls. Wormser, "Corporation's Power to Acquire its Stock", 24 Yale L.J.
177, 186-87 (1915) discusses the situation where "the
contract of purchase is made when the corporation is
solvent, but the corporation becomes insolvent before
payment is made on completed." Citing In the matter
of Fechheimer Fischel Co.~ Bankrupt~ 212 Fed. 357
(2d Cir., 1914), cert. den. 234 U.S. 760 (1914) the
article concludes that the financial condition at the time
"To make worse; to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or
strength; to deteriorate; damage; as, to impair health," Webster's
New International Dictionary (2d Ed), p. 1246.

s
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of payment, not at the ti1ne of contract, is the significant
fad. In arl'ord is the more recent case of In re Matthews
ConJJt. Co., 1~0 F. Supp. 818, 821 (S.D. Calif., 1954).
The Trial Court's conclusion that "the financial
structure of Robbins Travel Corporation was not in any
wny affected" was clearly erroneous. The condition
created by 16-2-16 (f) was not met.
POINT III
THE FACT THAT ROBBINS, INC.'S DEBT
TO PLAINTIFF AROSE SUBSEQUENT TO
ITS ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO DEFENDANT
IS I~IMATERIAL.
The Trial Court found that "the transaction between the Robbins Travel Corporation and the defendant Lun1an took place long prior to the indebtedness
of the Robbins Travel Corporation to the plaintiff"
(R. 17) . The record is clear that both the stock purchase
agreement of April, 1960, and the payments thereon
took place at least a year prior to contraction of the
indebtedness upon which plaintiff took judgment. (Tr.
14).

But of what importance is this? Pace v. Pace Bros.~
supra, settled LTtah law that a subsequent creditor may
attack a previous unlawful sale of stock. The holding
makes sense, for the illegal damage to the corporate
structtu·e is as harmful to future as to present creditors.
According to this Court at 59 P.2d 7:
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"Future as well as present creditors should
be able to rely on the implied representation that
the corporation holds assets as represented by its
outstanding stock."
The Pace decision has not been modified or overruled
in this regard, either by this Court or by the legislature.
The attempt to impugn plaintiff's status by its being
a future creditor is therefore nugatory.
If payment for a corporation's own stock is illegal,
it can recover from the payee, even though the contract
of purchase is fully executed, for-although the parties
are in pari delicto-the capital of the company has been
pro-tanto reduced by the payments and public policy
requires the intervention of the courts, 6A Fletcher Cyc.
Corps. §2852 at pp. 388-89; see Murphy Wholesale
Grocery Co. v. Skaggs~ 67 Utah 487, 248 Pac. 127, 130
( 1926). Plaintiff, pursuant to URCP 64D, garnisheed
this liquidated indebtedness from defendant to Robbins,
Inc., its judgment debtor. In view of the law and the
facts, the Trial Court erred in refusing judgment as
prayed.
CONCLUSION
In February or March, 1960, defendant became a
stockholder in Robbins, Inc. In April, 1960, Robbins,
Inc. purchased such stock, delivering a note to defendant. The corporation, while insolvent, made payments
in the amount of $1,900.00 pursuant to that note. The
transaction of April, 1960, and payments made pur-
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suant tht'reto were illegal and void as against public
poli('y. Plaintiff, as a judgment creditor of Robbins,
Inc., has standing-through garnishment-to raise such
illegality. and should have been granted judgment by
the Trial Court as prayed. It is prayed on appeal that
this Court reverse the Trial Court's decree of dismissal
and remand with the direction to enter judgment against
defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the sum of the
judgment debt owing by ~obbins, Inc. to plaintiff,
but not to exceed $1,900.00.
Respectfully submitted,
Kent Shearer
N eslen and Mock
Attorneys for Appellant
1003 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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